This discussion on the future of science diplomacy and cooperation between the Russian Federation and other Arctic and non-Arctic States was a continuation of the “Arctic Science Diplomacy: the Next Generation” dialogue that started at the 2023 Arctic Circle Assembly.
The session, which took place on October 17, 2024, was conceived as a space for the open expression of topics that are controversial and challenging, receive little attention and/or are too often ignored and unspoken. The lack of attention they are afforded, however, belies how critical these topics are for the development and maintenance of science diplomacy, given continued tensions between Russia and other Arctic states. The fact that today’s rising generation of diplomats has lost access to these critical connections across national borders endangers the viability of future relations. Because of its sensitivity, the session was conducted under Chatham House Rules, which allow ideas and observations but not names to leave the room. At the Arctic Circle Assembly 2024, out of over 250 sessions, Russia was included in the titles of only two, including our own. With our focus on the role of science diplomacy and the future of cooperation with Russia, the session was well received and was attended by over 80 people. Despite its short length, over ten individuals took to the podium to share personal observations as well as cautions and aspirations regarding how those assembled, an almost exclusively non-Russian crowd, might continue to advance research and preserve some of the conditions that have made the Arctic an exceptional space of cooperation. Some of the questions discussed during session were:
1) How do you envision the future of the Agreement on Enhancing Scientific Cooperation in the Arctic?
2) How can it continue to be implemented under the current geopolitical situation?
3) Do you foresee challenges in achieving the objectives of IPY5 (International Polar Year 5) within this context? If so, what are they?
When questioned about paths for continued collaboration with Russia, the speakers expressed divergent views. According to one perspective, collaboration with Russian scientists was impossible because the data was subject to extensive censorship and potential falsification. On the other hand, it was observed that on a peer-to-peer rather than an institutional basis, it was still possible to have meaningful exchange of research as well as communication. The data, some pointed out, while important, is also a critical window into retaining relationships. By addressing the values of science, scientific inquiry and integrity, some speakers insisted that by allowing politics to taint the work of the Arctic intellectual community, scientists had failed in core scientific commitments in spectacular fashion. It was mentioned that continuous engagement with Russian scientists has always required bravery and going against the grain, which, at times, results in paying the price of academic exclusion from western institutions. Most of the people that still visit Russia and engage scientifically were seasoned and established academics, whereas the routes for interactions on a pan-Arctic scale for young researchers are almost non-existent, presaging a generational gap in relationships and understanding.
A recurring question throughout the meeting was why scientific cooperation had been terminated in the Arctic following the Russian invasion of Ukraine while cooperation still continues in the Antarctic. Additionally, many speakers highlighted the ongoing engagement among all Arctic states in negotiations around the Central Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement as well as the recently-resumed work of Arctic Council working groups upon Norway assuming the Arctic Council chairmanship in May 2023. There was no definite agreement on why these exceptions were so apparent, but the stability of the Antarctic Treaty regime, geographic proximity of the Arctic to national homelands, and the geoeconomic significance of competition for Arctic energy and biological resources were raised as potential explanations. All agreed, however, that the consequences of the current situation were already proving detrimental for climate change research, especially relating to permafrost thaw, and for the Indigenous Peoples’ related research and circumpolar activities.
One of the worrying signs that some academics shared is the exclusion of Russia and the Russian Arctic from the western research agenda, as non-security-related research will likely diminish in importance and fundability. Identified were the deeply challenging fieldwork conditions in Russia for non-Russian scientists, who could face dramatic consequences for relatively insubstantial reasons, and Russian scientists, who face oppressive review and restrictions over publishing results related to the Russian Arctic, even those evincing low levels of sensitivity at a national security level. Whether research on Russia continues to receive support from Western scientific funding and policy bodies remains to be seen, but the near-impossibility of conducting fieldwork for many may drive a shift in research and funding priorities.
Another issue that was raised was the question of incentive or motivation for Russia to “rejoin” the Arctic community, especially as discourse at the Arctic Circle Assembly increasingly used the language of “Arctic Seven” and “like-minded Arctic nations”. Russia’s focus on the economic development of their own Arctic Zone had historically, in the Arctic Council and elsewhere, overshadowed any shared commitments to environmental conservation or Indigenous community well-being. With the current slate of sanctions and mutual hostility, Russia’s potential incentive for returning to the Arctic Council table at full scale is dampened by its participation at multiple other “tables”, including the BRICS+ coalition, where its sovereign national agenda faces little-to-no opposition.
It was observed that the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, a document that binds all eight Arctic nations to facilitate the open exchange of information and free movement of scientists, is currently not being implemented as no interaction is happening on a pan-Arctic scale; similarly, preparation for IPY5 is moving forward without meaningful participation of all Arctic states, threatening the integrity and validity of future research. Discussion of these topics alone warrants further discussion.
At the end of our Arctic Circle Assembly session, though further programming for reengagement remains unclear, the echoing words created an atmosphere composed of three sentiments: an emotional sense of the wrongness of our geopolitical situation, however valid from a realist perspective; the understanding that without cooperation at a pan-Arctic if not global scale, challenges of climate change and ecological collapse are unsolvable; and a recognition of the need to adapt both scientifically and politically to the inevitable accumulation of challenges. This last sentiment reflects the strategic insight underlying effective science diplomacy that political and scientific leadership must consider a “continuum of urgencies” in order to appropriately prioritize actions and involve the needed participants as fits the scale and severity of any given challenge. Climate change mitigation and adaptation are surely the most urgent priorities, requiring firm commitments and follow-through from the world’s most powerful nations to avert the most catastrophic scenarios. The urgencies of geopolitical conflict, rooted in more short-term thinking, fundamentally hamper even the dialogue necessary to adequately undertake this challenge.
Moving forward, there is a need to advance not only science diplomacy in all its permutations, but research diplomacy that centers exchange across knowledge systems, particularly those of Indigenous Peoples. Such activities, if undertaken with sufficient resources and broad support, can serve to build common interests across geopolitical divides in service to a robust and transformative International Decade of Sciences for Sustainable Development (2024-2033) and Decade of Action for Cryospheric Sciences (2025-2034) to enhance international Arctic scientific cooperation toward the 5th International Polar Year (IPY-5) in 2032-2033. As the oldest climate research program on the planet, IPY-5 offers an unparalleled opportunity to coalesce around a shared vision of not just the polar regions but our deeply interconnected planet, as the global community faces unprecedented intergenerational social and environmental challenges. As conceived by Inupiaq scholar Dr. Margaret Rudolf and Russian geographer Dr. Andrey Petrov, IPY-5 should be jointly prepared as “Indigenous People’s Year” to draw together the realms of scientific problem solving and investigation and Indigenous and social scientific approaches to relationship, knowledge, and actionable science. Adopting a holistic, boundary-spanning, and inclusive agenda in preparation for IPY may prove pivotal in moving our diverse but unified communities towards a cooperative and sustainable future.
This article was written by Nicholas Parlato, Alexandra Middleton, Susana Hancock, Zia Madani and Paul Arthur Berkman of the Science Diplomacy Center.